The EU-Member State Relationship as a Principal-Agent Problem

Endre Orbán

Ever since the European Union came into existence many theories have addressed the state of European integration. This paper tries to offer a further interpretation building on the principal-agent concept. The basic idea is expressed by the dilemma whether the EU should exclusively be seen as an agent of the Member States, or the situation is much more complex. The paper is going to detect three types of agency relationships within the European Union, and presents legal and political solutions of the founding treaties which aim to tackle the agency issues. Furthermore, the study analyzes two fundamental causes for the complexity of the European Union – Member State relationship. One of them are the shortcomings of the EU bureaucracy; the other cause – postulating the European Union as a value community – seems to have its current engine in Central Europe, namely in Hungary and Poland.

ISSN: 2036-5438
Centro Studi Federalismo

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